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Abstract 
 
Policies are rules governing the choices in behaviour of a system. They are increasingly being 
used as a means of implementing flexible and adaptive systems for management of internet 
services, networks, and security systems. There is also a need for a common specification of 
security policy for large-scale, multi-organisational systems where access control is 
implemented in a variety of heterogeneous components. In this paper we survey both security 
and management policy specification approaches, concentrating on practical systems in 
which the policy specification can be directly translated into an implementation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern network components such as routers and switches need to be programmable to 
support the adaptive quality of service (QoS) required by multimedia applications and mobile 
computing users. Portable intelligent communicators will always have limited processing, 
storage, communication capability and battery life compared to desktop workstations and so 
will need to make use of local network services to provide a seamless ubiquitous computing 
environment. This environment will require fast service creation and resource management 
through a combination of network-aware applications and application-aware networks. 
Adaptive networks must support rapid deployment of customised services tailored for 
potentially mobile, corporate and individual users. 
There are many mechanisms being promoted for programming network components, 
including code carrying IP packets which are executed by the routers traversed by the 
packets; scripts or interpreted code loaded via a management interface and mobile agents 
carrying both code and data which autonomously migrate around the network [1]. All of 
these are very powerful mechanisms which can potentially destroy the network if the code 
contains malicious or inadvertent bugs. Policies provide a more constrained means for 
adaptive behaviour of components [2]. 
Internet and e-commerce applications typically involve many different organisations – 
manufacturers, merchants, network service providers, banks and customers. Specifying and 
analysing the security for such environments to determine who can access what resources or 
information can be extremely difficult. The problem is that the access control is distributed 
across many heterogeneous components such as databases, operating systems, firewalls, and 
filtering routers controlled by the different interacting organisations. Even in the 
programmable network environment there is a need to define who is authorised and under 
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what conditions they can inject code packets, scripts, mobile agents or policy rules into 
network components and what resources or functions these ‘programs’ can access. Security 
management needs similar adaptivity to that of network management to specify actions to 
take in response to simple security violations such as excessive login attempts but also for 
changing the behaviour and applicable policies in firewalls or web servers under denial of 
service or other network based attacks.  
Policies are rules governing the choices in behaviour of a system [3]. Obligation policies are 
event triggered condition-action rules which can be used to define the conditions for 
reserving network resources, changing queuing strategy, loading code onto a router, or 
reconfiguring an FPGA for higher performance but with reduced error correction capability. 
Some policies may be user or application specific, such as what information to filter when 
bandwidth or device capabilities are limited. Authorisation policies are used to define what 
services or resources a subject (management agent, user or role) can access. Policies are 
persistent so that a one-off command to perform an action is not a policy. Scripts and mobile 
agents are often based on powerful interpreted languages such as Java, so can be used to 
introduce new functionality into network components. Policies define choices in behaviour in 
terms of the conditions under which predefined operations or actions can be invoked rather 
than changing the functionality of the actual operations themselves. 
The main motivation for the recent interest in policy-based services, networks and security 
systems is to support dynamic adaptability of behaviour by changing policy without recoding 
or stopping the system [4]. This implies that it should be possible to dynamically update the 
policy rules interpreted by distributed entities to modify their behaviour.  
Large-scale systems may contain millions of users and resources. It is not practical to specify 
policies relating to individual entities – instead, it must be possible to specify policies relating 
to groups of entities and also to nested groups such as sections within departments, within 
sites in different countries in an international organisation. It is also useful to group the 
policies pertaining to the rights and duties of a role or position within an organisation such as 
a network operator, nurse in a ward or mobile computing ‘visitor’ in a hotel.  
Policies are derived from business goals, service level agreements or trust relationships 
within or between enterprises. The refinement of these abstract policies into policies relating 
to specific services and then into policies implementable by specific devices supporting the 
service is not easy, and not amenable to automation.  
This paper provides a survey of some of the work on policy specification for both security 
management and policy-driven network management. Rather than covering many papers 
superficially we have concentrated on a few exemplary approaches in more detail, with 
emphasis on practical rather than theoretical approaches. In section 2 we describe examples 
of security policy specification – Role Based Access Control provides the grouping of 
policies (permissions) related to an organisational position and the Trust Policy Language 
indicates the use of credential-based policies. In section 3 we cover various approaches to 
management policy specification, namely the Policy Description Language for event-
triggered policies from Lucent and the ongoing work in the IETF/DMTF on standardisation 
of policy information models. In section 4 we describe our Ponder policy specification 
language which combines many of the above concepts and can be used for both security and 
management policies. We do not discuss routing policies as these have been described in a 
recent survey [5]. WWW references to much of the work on policy and many of the papers 
described here can be found from [6]. 
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2 SECURITY POLICY SPECIFICATION 
2.1 Role-Based Access Control 
Although Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is not directly concerned with policy 
specification, it has been accepted as a security model which permits the specification and 
enforcement of organisational access control policies. The fundamental concept on which 
RBAC relies is that permissions are associated with roles rather than users, thus separating 
the assignment of users to roles from the assignment of permissions to roles. Users acquire 
access rights by virtue of their role memberships, and they can be dynamically assigned or 
removed from roles without changing the permissions associated with their role. Multiple 
users can be assigned to the same role and multiple roles can be assigned to the same users.  
Although the concept of role has existed in a fairly similar form for a long time both in 
systems security and in Role Theory, the work presented by Sandhu in [7] and the first 
RBAC workshop [8] have prompted a renewed interest in this approach which is now 
adopted to different degrees in many commercial products.  
The main goal of RBAC goes beyond the concept of role and aims to simplify permission 
management in large organisations. To achieve this, roles must be combined in a structured 
way and permissions must be “reused”. The most popular approach relies on role inheritance 
where senior roles such as team leader, or project supervisor inherit the permissions of junior 
roles such as employee, team member, etc. However other approaches such as assigning roles 
to other roles can also be found in the literature.  
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Figure 1 Role Hierarchies 
A possible role hierarchy for an academic institution is described in Figure 1 which illustrates 
how role inheritance provides the sharing of resources through common lower level roles and 
the aggregation of permissions through inheritance of permissions to the higher level. 
However, such role inheritance hierarchies are not without shortcomings as there are 
numerous exceptions to the rule that senior roles inherit all the permissions of junior roles. 
Most notably, access to private files and permissions granted by virtue of a competency are 
not inherited. For example, the head of department does not usually inherit the access right of 
a system administrator. To accommodate such situations it is necessary to create private roles 
as shown in Figure 1, which group the permissions that are not inherited upwards in the 
hierarchy. Implementing an RBAC system with inheritance of permissions between roles 
considerably reduces the number of permissions in the system. However, in a distributed 
system it may also render access control checks, performed on each invocation, more 
complex since the inherited roles may be stored remotely and checking the inherited 
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permissions may require several remote invocations. To avoid this increased complexity, a 
capability-based system may be more appropriate for RBAC since it shifts the responsibility 
for collecting the inherited permissions to the user (subject) system and this is done prior to 
the access control check.  
Several constraints may apply to an RBAC model across its associations, between users and 
roles, roles and permissions or between roles themselves (inheritance) [9]. Amongst these, 
separation of duty constraints, which identify mutually exclusive sets of permissions that a 
user is not allowed to hold, have been the subject of the most intensive work. 
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Figure 2 RBAC Model (From [7]) 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the RBAC model with the various relationships between users 
roles and permissions, and the constraints. The model presented in [7] also introduces the 
concept of sessions. A session groups the permissions from a selected number of roles which 
the user may want active at a given moment in time i.e., in a work session. The user can then 
use all access rights from the active roles in order to carry out his tasks.  
The RBAC model presented above is the foundation from which many variations have 
developed. In particular, the team-based access control has developed as a means of 
simultaneously activating a set of related roles e.g., the surgeon, nurses and other personnel in 
an operating theatre.  
Although, the concept of role is not new, the introduction of RBAC models has fostered a 
change from the traditional mandatory and discretionary access control models to a new 
framework where the access control policy is neither rigidly embedded in the implementation 
nor left to the owner of each resource but can be implemented on the basis of clearly 
specified organisational policies.  
2.2 IBM’s Trust Policy Language 
There are a number of groups which use the term ‘trust management’ for frameworks that 
support sophisticated authorisation policy specification and implementation using public key 
certificates as credentials to authenticate identities or membership of groups [10], [11]. This 
can be particularly useful for e-commerce and internet applications. We will describe the 
IBM Trust Policy Language (TPL) and support system as an exemplar of this approach [12].  
TPL uses XML to define policy rules which specify the criteria for a client to be assigned to a 
group which is similar to a role. Standard database or operating system authorisation rules are 
then used to define what resources a group can access as shown in Figure 3. Thus, the 
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authority that issues certificates for a role can be completely different from the one that 
defines access control policy for a resource. 
Group 
assignment 
TPL 
Policy 
Access 
control 
OS/Database 
Access Control  
Policy 
Yes or 
No 
Certi ficates Actions 
Resource 
  
 Figure 3 Separation of Group Assignment from Access Control Decision  
The TPL policy consists of a list of required X509 certificates which permit a client to 
become a member of a group and a Boolean function relating the values of the fields in one 
or more certificates to define group membership criteria. Example groups include employees 
of an organisation, registered customer for a merchant or a recognised cardiologist at a 
hospital. An example medical group membership criteria could be possession of 3 
recommendation certificates from hospitals with recommendation level >3. 
A certificate identifies the issuer, the subject to whom they are issued (which could be a name 
or an anonymous public key) and a list of name value pairs which may contain information 
such as age, sex and rank of the holder. The certificate may also contain links to repositories 
for additional certificates for the issuer or subject as multiple certificates may be needed for a 
client to be assigned to a group.  
 
<POLICY> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”self”> 
</GROUP> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”partners”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”partner” TYPE=”partner” FROM “self”>  
</INCLUSION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”departments”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”partner” TYPE=”partner” FROM=”partners”> 
</INCLUSION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”customers”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”customer” TYPE=”employee” FROM=”departments”> 
</INCLUSION> 
<FUNCTION> 
<GT> 
<FIELD ID=”customer” NAME=”rank”></FIELD> 
<CONST>3</CONST> 
</GT> 
</FUNCTION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
 
</POLICY> 
Figure 4 TPL Example 
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The TPL policies shown in Figure 4 are for a retailer (the self group in the policy) to give 
discounts to preferred customers who are employees of a department of a partner company. 
Entities that have partner certificates, signed by the retailer, are placed in the group partners. 
The group department is defined as any user having a partner certificate signed by the 
partners group. Finally, the customer group consists of anyone that has an employee 
certificate signed by a member of the departments group who has a rank > 3.  
TPL is available for download from IBM Alphaworks and is very flexible as a means for 
defining authorisation policy for an internet service but the XML syntax is rather verbose and 
unreadable. Although a policy can have multiple rules, there is no inheritance or reuse 
between different policy specifications and it is not suitable for specifying security 
management policy. 
2.3 Other Security Policy Specification Approaches 
There has been considerable interest in logic-based approaches to specifying authorisation 
policy as exemplified by [13], [14]. They assume a strong mathematical background, which 
can make them difficult to use and understand, and they do not easily map onto 
implementation mechanisms. The ASL language [13] includes a form of meta-policies called 
integrity rules to specify application-dependent rules that limit the range of acceptable access 
control policies. Although it provides support for role-based access control, the language does 
not scale well to large systems because there is no way of grouping rules into structures for 
reusability. A separate rule must be specified for each action. There is no explicit 
specification of delegation and no means of specifying authorisation rules for groups of 
objects that are not related by type. 
Ortalo [14] describes a language to express security policies in information systems based on 
the logic of permissions and obligations, a type of modal logic called deontic logic. Standard 
deontic logic centres on impersonal statements of the form  “it is obliged that p” which do not 
necessarily identify to whom the obligation applies. Ortalo accepts the axiom Pp = ¬O¬p 
(“permitted p is equivalent to not p being not obliged”) as a suitable definition of permission. 
In our view, an obligation policy requires a relevant authorisation policy to permit the actions 
defined in the obligation but an obligation policy does not imply an authorisation policy. 
Others, focus on the specification and implementation of access control policies for mobile 
agent systems. In most cases the studies focus on reconfigurable access control policies in the 
Java environment. They have included both the translation of higher level policies into Java 
security policies as well as different access control mechanisms within Java [15], [16]. 
3 MANAGEMENT POLICY SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Lucent’s Policy Definition Language 
The Policy Definition Language (PDL) was developed at Lucent Bell Labs for network 
management and is based on active database declarative event-condition-action rules i.e., 
obligation policies [17]. It is a very simple language with 2 main constructs – a policy rule 
corresponding to an obligation policy and a rule for triggering other events: 
 Policy Rule: event causes action ( t1= v1, ….tk=vk) if condition 
 Policy Defined Event (pde): event triggers pde ( t1= v1, ….tk=vk) if condition 
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where ti = parameter (attribute) type and vi = value. Every event has a timestamp and the 
URL of the source which generated it. Primitive events can be generated by the managed 
environment or by other PDEs. An Epoch is an application specific time window in which a 
set of events are considered to occur simultaneously e.g., day, hour, second. Complex events 
include:  
• e1 & e2 &… & en = conjunction of events in an epoch 
• e1 | e2 |… | en = disjunction of events in an epoch 
• !e = no occurrence of event in an epoch 
• ^e = a sequence of zero or more occurrences of an event 
• group (e1 & e2 &… & en) or group (e1 | e2 |… | en) =  
a single event grouping all instances of the complex event. If there are n instance of e1 
and m instances of event e2 in an epoch then there is only one occurrence of group  
(e1 & e2) instead of m x n occurrences. 
• count (e, e.x>4) counts the number of occurrences of event e for which parameter x > 4 is 
true 
• Other aggregations – max, min, ave etc. relating to event parameters. 
An example is given in Figure 5 of the use of PDL to define a policy for a network 
component which rejects call requests when in overload mode. 
Overload threshold: (time outs/calls made) > t 
Normal threshold: (time outs/calls made) < n 
Events:  normal, restricted : pde 
  callMade, timeOut, powerOn: system events 
  /* the above events have no attributes */ 
Actions:  restrictCalls, acceptAll 
Policies: powerOn triggers normal  // a normal event is triggered when the component is switched 
 
  normal, ^(callMade | timeOut) triggers restricted if count (timeOut) > t*count(callMade) 
/* after a normal event, a sequence of callMade or timout events will trigger restrictCalls if the 
overload threshold is exceeded */  
  restricted causes restrictCalls   // sets overload mode to reject call requests 
  restricted, ^(callMade | timeout) triggers normal if count (timeOut) < n*count(callMade) 
/* when in overload mode, a sequence of callMade or timout events will trigger normal if the 
normal threshold is exceeded */ 
 normal causes acceptAll 
 /* Assumes only one callMade or timeOut event per epoch */ 
Figure 5 PDL Example 
PDL is implemented and used in Lucent switching products [18]. It shows that event-
condition-action rules are a very flexible approach to specifying management policy. It has 
also been extended to specify complex workflow tasks. However, it does not support any 
form of policy composition or reuse of specifications. 
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3.2 CIM Policy model 
The Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) [19], in collaboration with the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Policy work group [20], are defining a policy information 
model as an extension to the Core Information Model (CIM), known as PCIM [21]. An 
information model is “an abstraction and representation of the entities in a managed 
environment – their properties, operation, and relationships”. This is independent of any 
specific repository, application, protocol or platform. The IETF are defining a mapping of the 
PCIM model to a directory schema so that an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) 
directory can be used as a repository. The CIM defines generic objects such a managed 
system elements, logical and physical elements, systems, service and service access point etc. 
The Policy Model defines a policy rule and its component policy conditions and policy 
actions as shown in Figure 6 and 7. The assumption is that a policy rule is of the form if 
<condition set> then do <action list>. The condition set can be expressed in either disjunctive or 
conjunctive normal form. Note that there is no explicit triggering event specified as part of 
the policy, although it is similar to an obligation policy. It is assumed that the agent 
interpreting the event will evaluate the policy when an implicit event occurs such as a new 
session is set up or possibly on every message.  
 
 
Figure 6 (PCIM) Policy Core Information Model (from [23]) 
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PolicyTimePeriodCondition
TimePeriod:  string
MonthOfYearMask:  uint8[ ][Octetstring]
DayOfMonthMask:  uint8[ ][Octetstring]
DayOfWeekMask:  uint8[ ][Octetstring]
TimeOfDayMask:  string
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PolicyRule
PolicyAction (ABSTRACT)
SystemCreationClassName:  string[key]
SystemName:  string[key]
PolicyRuleCreationClassName: string[key]
PolicyRuleName:  string[key]
CreationClassName:  string[key]
PolicyActionName:  string[key]
PolicyActionIn
PolicyRule
PolicyConditionIn
PolicyRule
CreationClassName:  string[key]
PolicyGroupName:  string[key]
PolicyGroup
PolicyRuleInPolicyGroup
VendorPolicyCondition
Constraint: Octetstring[ ]
ConstraintEncoding:  string[OID]
  VendorPolicyAction
ActionData:  Octetstring[ ]
ActionEncoding:  string[OID]
PolicyRule
ValidityPeriod
CommonName:  string
PolicyKeywords:  string[ ]
Policy (ABSTRACT)
AdminDomain
PolicyConditionIn
PolicyRepository
PolicyActionIn
PolicyRepository
PolicyRepository
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
0..1 0..1
PolicyComponent
*
Figure 7 PCIM Conditions and Actions (from [23]) 
Policy rules may be aggregated into nested policy groups to define the policies pertaining to a 
department, user etc. Conditions and actions may be specific to a rule or can optionally be 
stored separately in a policy repository and reused by multiple rules. Sophisticated time 
period conditions can be defined in terms of times, masks for days in a week, days at 
beginning or end of month, months in year etc. The actions can be defined as being sequential 
or any order. 
The IETF has also defined extensions to PCIM called the QoS Policy Information Model 
(QPIM) which contains a set of abstractions specific to IntServ and DiffServ management 
[22]. For example they have abstract objects for classifiers, meters, shapers, droppers and 
queues, which can be mapped onto the control elements provided by a specific DiffServ 
router. Specific priority values are assigned to policy rules to resolve conflicts. 
A simple DiffServ QPIM Policy is shown in Figure 8. 
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If (SourcePort == MyWebServerPort) then Color DSCP=5 
 
This is represented by the following LDAP Objects  
 
Objectclass:qosPolicyRule 
Type: 1 
Direction: out 
Priority: 1 
 
Objectclass: qosColorPolicyAction 
DSCPValue: 5 
 
Objectclass: qosColorPolicyCondition 
Type: Integer OID 
Operator: “==” 
 
Objectclass: qosPolicyVariable 
Name: SourcePort 
Type: IntegerOID 
 
Objectclass: qosPolicyConstant 
Name: MyWebServerPort 
Type: IntegerOID 
 
Objectclass: qosPolicyNumberValue 
Type: IntegerOID 
PortValue: 80 
 
Figure 8 QPIM Example Policy (from [23]) 
As can be seen from Figure 8, the LDAP schema representation of a very simple policy is 
extremely verbose and not really aimed at human interpretation. It is assumed this will be 
generated from a graphical tool of the form provided by a number of vendors or from a high 
level language such as Ponder, described in section 4. PCIM does not distinguish between 
authorisation and obligation policies. The emphasis in the working groups has been on QoS 
policies which can be considered obligation policies without event triggers. However they 
can specify simple admission control policies by means of an action to accept or deny a 
message to give the effect of a positive or negative authorisation policy. The term ‘role’ is 
defined as a characteristic of a managed element and is used as a means of identifying 
elements to which a policy applies e.g., a gigabitEthernet role policy may apply to all 
elements which have a gigabit Ethernet interface.  
It is assumed that policies are objects stored in an LDAP directory service. A policy 
consumer (policy decision point – PDP) retrieves policies from the policy repository (e.g., 
LDAP server). A policy execution point (PEP), such as a router, requests policy decisions 
using the Common Open Policy Service Protocol (COPS). The PEP enforces the policy, for 
example, by permitting/forbidding requests or allocating packets from a connection to a 
particular queue. A PEP and PDP could be combined into a single component. Note that there 
is no explicit event to trigger an IETF policy. An implicit event such a packet arrival at a 
router will trigger the search for applicable policies. The policy condition will typically 
define a specific address or range of source or destination IP addresses or ports to which a 
policy applies so this information taken from the packet can be used to find which policies 
apply. It is only practical for the PEP to query the PDP for a decision on comparatively 
infrequent packets such as an IntServ request related to a connection set up. If policy 
decisions are needed on every packet, such as for DiffServ, then these have to be preloaded 
into the PEP by the PDP using the COPS policy provisioning mode. Note that the use of 
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COPS is not mandated by the IETF and other protocols such as SNMP or HTTP could be 
used for transferring policy information. There have been suggestions for extensions to the 
IETF approach to include explicit events for policies that deal with failures, overload 
situation etc., but so far nothing concrete has emerged. 
3.3 Other Approaches to Policy Specification  
There are a number of vendors producing policy-based management tools, usually with a 
graphical user interface for defining policies and allocating them to devices to which they 
apply. These generally follow the approach of the IETF policy work, which is still in 
progress, so there are not yet any standards to be compliant with. Initially the main focus was 
on QoS management but some of the vendors are extending this to include support for 
provisioning of virtual private networks (see [6] for links to vendor web sites). [24] gives a 
detailed description of the architectures and algorithms needed to support an IETF approach 
to policy-based networking. It covers some of the issues of translating from higher level 
service level goals into policies for specific components in the network and how to distribute 
the policies to the relevant components.  
The ODP Reference Model Enterprise Viewpoint [25] defines concepts for specifying an 
abstraction of a system within a defined environment in terms of the system’s purpose, its 
scope and the policies that apply to the system from its environment as well as those defined 
within the system. The current specification defines terms such as policy, authorisation, 
prohibition, obligation, role, domain, and community but there is no associated language by 
which a system can be clearly specified, analysed or implemented. There have been several 
attempts at defining Enterprise Viewpoint specifications by using the Unified Modelling 
Language UML possibly with added extensions [26],[27],[28]. Proposals have alternated 
between modelling policies as notes attached to the design elements, OCL constraints or 
additional extensions to UML. [27] indicates that OCL is not directly suitable for expressing 
ODP prohibitions or obligations. These approaches encounter difficulties related to the level 
of abstraction of the specification. Enterprise Viewpoint specifications are intended to be 
more general and more abstract than the system design elements of UML. Hence, Enterprise 
Viewpoint concepts are not defined in UML but can be realised (implemented) by a design 
that could be specified in UML. For example, an authorisation policy is implemented by a set 
of objects such as capabilities, certificates or access control list entries, and an obligation can 
be realised by the implementation of a particular activity diagram or collaboration. However, 
the enterprise level description requires a more abstract representation of the policy than the 
diagram of invocations, which implement it. It is therefore important to be able to identify a 
minimal and concrete representation for the Enterprise Viewpoint concepts, which represent 
functional aspects of the system rather than encumber a design notation with abstract 
concepts that need to be implemented by other representations in the same notation. The 
various models proposed for defining Enterprise Concepts in UML are complex and differ 
substantially between them with little prospect of convergence or consensus. 
Minsky’s “law governed systems” specify permissions and prohibition as a set of rules which 
are similar to positive and negative authorisations. Their approach supports a common global 
set of constraints, similar to obligation policies, which are implemented by means of filters in 
every node which check that all interactions are consistent with a global law [29].  
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4 PONDER 
The Ponder language for specifying Management and Security policies [30] evolved out of 
work on policy management at Imperial College over a period of about 10 years. Ponder is a 
declarative, object-oriented language that can be used to specify security policies that map 
onto various access control mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java 
[15]. It supports obligation policies that are event triggered condition-action rules for policy 
based management of networks and distributed systems. Ponder can also be used for security 
management activities such as registration of users or logging and auditing events for dealing 
with access to critical resources or security violations. Key concepts of the language include 
domains to group the objects to which policies apply, roles to group policies relating to a 
position in an organisation [31], relationships to define interactions between roles and 
management structures to define a configuration of roles and relationships pertaining to an 
organisational unit such as a department or a section. 
4.1 Domains 
Domains provide a means of grouping objects to which policies apply and can be used to 
partition the objects in a large system according to geographical boundaries, object type, 
responsibility and authority or for the convenience of human managers. Membership of a 
domain is explicit and not defined in terms of a predicate on object attributes. A domain does 
not encapsulate the objects it contains but merely holds references to objects. A domain is 
thus very similar in concept to a file system directory but may hold references to any type of 
objects, including a person. A domain, which is a member of another domain, is called a sub-
domain of the parent domain. A sub-domain is not a subset of the parent domain, in that an 
object included in a sub-domain is not a direct member of the parent domain, but is an 
indirect member, c.f., a file in a sub-directory is not a direct member of a parent directory. An 
object or sub-domain may be a member of multiple parent domains i.e., domains can overlap. 
An advantage of specifying policy scope in terms of domains is that objects can be added and 
removed from the domains to which policies apply without having to change the policies. 
Domains have been implemented as directories in an extended LDAP Service. 
4.2 Ponder primitive policies 
Authorisation policies define what activities a member of the subject domain can perform on 
the set of objects in the target domain. These are essentially access control policies, to protect 
resources and services from unauthorized access. A positive authorisation policy defines the 
actions that subjects are permitted to perform on target objects. A negative authorisation 
policy specifies the actions that subjects are forbidden to perform on target objects. 
The language provides reuse by supporting the definition of policy types to which any policy 
element can be passed as formal parameter. Multiple instances can then be created and 
tailored for the specific environment by passing actual parameters as shown in Figure 9. 
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type auth+ PolicyOpsT (subject s, target <PolicyT> t) { 
  action load(), remove(), enable(), disable() ; } 
 
inst auth+ switchPolicyOps=PolicyOpsT(/NetworkAdmins, Nregion/switches); 
inst auth+ routersPolicyOps=PolicyOpsT(/QoSAdmins, /Nregion/routers); 
The two policy instances created from a PolicyOpsT type allow members of /NetworkAdmins and 
/QoSAdmins (subjects) to load, remove, enable or disable objects of type PolicyT within the 
/Nregion/switches and /Nregion/routers domains (targets) respectively. 
Figure 9 Example Ponder Authorisation Policies  
Policies can also be declared directly without using a type as shown in the negative 
authorisation policy in Figure 10, which also shows the use of a time based constraint to limit 
the applicability of the policy 
 
inst auth– /negativeAuth/testRouters { 
 subject  /testEngineers/trainee ; 
 action  performance_test() ; 
 target  <routerT> /routers ;  
 when  time.between (“0900”, “1700”) 
} 
Trainee test engineers are forbidden to perform performance tests on routers between the hours of 0900 
and 1700. The policy is stored within the /negativeAuth domain. 
Figure 10 Direct Policy Declaration 
Ponder also supports a number of other basic policies for specifying security policy: 
Information filtering policy can be used to transform input or output parameters in an 
interaction. For example, a location service might permit access to detailed location 
information, such as the specific room in which a person is, only to users within the 
department. External users can only determine whether a person is at work or not. Delegation 
policy permits subjects to grant privileges, which they possess (due to an existing 
authorisation policy), to grantees to perform an action on their behalf e.g., passing read rights 
to a printer spooler in order to print a file. Refrain policies define the actions that subjects 
must refrain from performing (must not perform) on target objects even though they may 
actually be permitted to perform the action. Refrain policies act as restraints on the actions 
that subjects perform and are implemented by subjects. See [30] for more details and 
examples of these policies. 
Obligation policies are event-triggered, condition-action rules similar to Lucent’s PDL, and 
define the activities subjects (human or automated manager components) must perform on 
objects in the target domain. Events can be simple, i.e. an internal timer event, or an external 
event notified by monitoring service components e.g. a temperature exceeding a threshold or 
a component failing. Composite events can be specified using event composition operators. 
 
inst oblig loginFailure {  
 on     3*loginfail(userid) ;  
 subject   s = /NRegion/SecAdmin ; 
 target <userT>  t = /NRegion/users ^ {userid} ; 
 do     t.disable() -> s.log(userid) ;  
} 
This policy is triggered by 3 consecutive loginfail events with the same userid. The NRegion security 
administrator (SecAdmin) disables the user with userid in the /NRegion/users domain and then logs the 
failed userid by means of a local operation performed in the SecAdmin object. The ‘->’ operator is used to 
separate a sequence of actions in an obligation policy. Names are assigned to both the subject and the 
target. They can then be reused within the policy. In this example we use them to prefix the actions in 
order to indicate whether the action is on the interface of the target or local to the subject. 
Figure 11 Example Ponder Obligation Policy 
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4.3 Ponder Composite Policies 
Ponder composite policies facilitate policy management in large, complex enterprises. They 
provide the ability to group policies and structure them to reflect organisational structure, 
preserve the natural way system administrators operate or simply provide reusability of 
common definitions. This simplifies the task of policy administrators. 
Roles provide a semantic grouping of policies with a common subject, generally pertaining to 
a position within an organisation such as department manager, project manager, analyst or 
ward-nurse. Specifying organizational policies for human managers in terms of manager 
positions rather than persons permits the assignment of a new person to the manager position 
without re-specifying the policies referring to the duties and authorizations of that position. A 
role can also specify the policies that apply to an automated component acting as a subject in 
the system. Organisational positions can be represented as domains and we consider a role to 
be the set of authorisation, obligation, refrain and delegation policies with the subject domain 
of the role as their subject. A role is just a group of policies in which all the policies have the 
same subject, which is defined implicitly, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
type role ServiceEngineer (CallsDB callsDb) { 
 inst oblig serviceComplaint { 
  on   customerComplaint(mobileNo) ; 
  do   t.checkSubscriberInfo(mobileNo) -> 
    t.checkPhoneCallList(mobileNo) ->  
    traceSignalReception(mobileNo); 
  target  t = callsDb ; // calls register } 
  
  inst oblig deactivateAccount { . . . } 
  inst auth+ serviceActionsAuth { . . . } 
 // other policies 
}  
The role type ServiceEngineer models a service engineer role in a mobile telecommunications service. A 
service engineer is responsible for responding to customer complaints and service requests. The role type 
is parameterised with the calls database, a database of subscribers in the system and their calls. The 
obligation policy serviceComplaint is triggered by a customerComplaint event with the mobile number of 
the customer given as an event attribute. On this event, the subject of the role must execute a sequence of 
actions on the calls-database in order check the information of the subscriber whose mobile-number was 
passed in through the complaint event, check the phone list and then trace the signal reception. Note that 
the obligation policy does not specify a subject as all policies within the role have the same implicit subject.  
Figure 12 Example Role policy 
Managers acting in organisational positions (roles) interact with each other. A relationship 
groups the policies defining the rights and duties of roles towards each other. It can also 
include policies related to resources that are shared by the roles within the relationship. It thus 
provides an abstraction for defining policies that are not the roles themselves but are part of 
the interaction between the roles. The syntax of a relationship is very similar to that of a role 
but a relationship can include definitions of the roles participating in the relationship. 
However roles cannot have nested role definitions. Participating roles can also be defined as 
parameters within a relationship type definition as shown below. 
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type rel ReportingT (ProjectManagerT pm, SecretaryT secr) { 
 inst oblig reportWeekly { 
  on  timer.day (“monday”) ; 
  subject  secr ; 
  target  pm ; 
  do  mailReport() ;  
  } 
 // . . . other policies 
} 
The ReportingT relationship type is specified between a ProjectManager role type and a Secretary role 
type. The obligation policy reportWeekly specifies that the subject of the SecretaryT role must mail a report 
to the subject of the ProjectManagerT role every Monday. The use of roles in place of subjects and targets 
implicitly refers to the subject of the corresponding role. 
Figure 13 Example Relationship type 
Many large organisations are structured into units such as branch offices, departments, and 
hospital wards, which have a similar configuration of roles and policies. Ponder supports the 
notion of management structures to define a configuration in terms of instances of roles, 
relationships and nested management structures relating to organisational units. For example 
a management structure type would be used to define a branch in a bank or a department in a 
university and then instantiated for particular branches or departments. A management 
structure is thus a composite policy containing the definition of roles, relationships and other 
nested management structures as well as instances of these composite policies. 
Figure 14 shows a simple management structure for a software development company 
consisting of a project manager, software developers and a project contact secretary. Figure 
15 gives the definition of the structure. 
P 
supervise 
report 
Project 
manager
Software 
developers
Project 
contact  
Figure 14 Simple Management Structure 
 
type mstruct BranchT (...) { 
 inst  role  projectManager = ProjectManagerT(…); 
  role  projectContact  = SecretaryT(...); 
  role  softDeveloper  = SoftDeveloperT(...); 
 
 inst rel  supervise = SupervisionT (projectManager, softDeveloper); 
  rel  report = ReportingT (projectContact, projectManager);  
} 
inst  mstruct branchA = BranchT(…); 
 mstruct branchB = BranchT(…); 
This declares instances of the 3 roles shown in Figure 12. Two relationships govern the interactions 
between these roles. A supervise relationship between the softDeveloper and the projectManager, and a 
reporting relationship between the ProjectContact and the projectManager. Two instances of the BranchT 
type are created for branches within the organisation that exhibit the same role-relationship requirements. 
Figure 15 Software company management structure 
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Ponder allows specialisation of policy types, through inheritance. When a type extends 
another, it inherits all of its elements, adds new elements and overrides elements with the 
same name. This is particularly useful for specialisation of composite policies. For example it 
would be possible to define a new type of mobile systems project manager, from a project 
manager role (c.f. Figure 12) with additional policies.  
In Ponder a person can be assigned to multiple roles but rights from one role cannot be used 
to perform actions relating to another role. A person can also have policies that pertain to 
him/her as an individual and have nothing to do with any roles. In RBAC inheritance is based 
on policy instances and all policies are defined in terms of roles. This means RBAC requires 
a much more complicated role structure to separate the policies that are inherited from those 
that are private. 
A compiler has been implemented for the Ponder language. Various backends have also been 
implemented to generate firewall rules, Windows access control templates, Java security 
policies [15] and Java obligation policy rules for interpretation by a policy agent. We also 
have a system to automatically disseminate policies to the relevant agents which will interpret 
them i.e., to subjects for obligation and refrain policies and access control agents for 
authorisation and filter policies [33]. 
5 RESEARCH ISSUES 
5.1 Conflict Analysis 
There are a number of different conflicts that can arise from policies. For example, it might 
be possible that different QPIM policies apply for marking packets relating to a specific flow 
as one selects packets based on a range of IP addresses and another selects packets based on  
port numbers. The solution proposed in the IETF framework advocates assigning explicit 
priorities to policies but this is notoriously difficult to do in large systems where many 
different people are responsible for specifying policies. In Ponder modality conflicts arise 
between positive and negative policies which apply to the same subjects, targets and actions 
[32]. These can be detected by syntactic analysis of the policies as the conflict can be 
determined by detecting overlap of subjects, targets and actions. However, the analysis 
detects only potential conflicts rather than actual conflicts since constraints may limit the 
applicability of the policy to disjoint sets of circumstances e.g., different times of day. While 
modality conflicts can be detected syntactically, other conflicts can only be determined by 
understanding the actions being performed by the policies. For example, there will be a 
conflict between two policies which result in the same packet being placed on 2 different 
queues. Similarly, separation of duty conflicts arise from authorisation policies which permit 
the same person to approve payments and sign cheques. Generally, these conflicts are 
application specific and to detect them it is necessary to specify the conditions which result in 
conflict. The approach is therefore to specify constraints on the set of policies (i.e. meta-
policies) using a suitable notation and then analyse the policy set against these constraints to 
determine if there are any conflicts [32]. Whether conflicts occur or not may depend on run-
time parameters specified in constraints such as time or the current state of the components to 
which the policy apply. It is thus rather difficult to determine all possible conflicting 
conditions in advance and so it is still necessary to detect conflicts at run-time. Furthermore, 
when conflicting policies are detected it is not obvious how to resolve the conflicts 
automatically. Explicit priority may work in some cases. In some situations, negative 
authorisation policies should override positive ones, but in other situations the positive 
authorisation is an exception to a more general negative authorisation. In some situations 
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more specific policies that apply to a department may override general policies applying to 
the whole organisation. We have been experimenting with meta-policies which define an 
application specific precedence relationships between conflicting policies.  
Although some progress has been made in dealing with policy conflicts [24], [32], significant 
challenges remain to be addressed. In particular, how can one detect conflicts when arbitrary 
conditions restrict the applicability of the policies? Sometimes, it is possible to compare 
restrictions placed by the constraints. For example, it is possible to detect if two time 
intervals overlap or if the policies apply when subjects are in different states e.g., active or 
standby. However, the problem remains unsolved in the general case. Other challenges 
concern the different levels of abstraction at which policy is specified. Conflicts between 
organisational goals will inevitably lead to conflicts between the policies derived from these 
goals. Some policies will trigger complex management procedures which require the 
execution of actions that may be specified as part of different policies. This, renders the task 
of ensuring the consistency of a policy specification much more complex.   
5.2 Refinement 
Both network and security policies are specified with a view to fulfil organisational goals and 
service level objectives. The process of deriving a more concrete specification from a higher-
level objective is termed refinement. Although, the goal of automating refinement of 
management and security policies from higher-level objectives remains a worthy one, it is not 
practical for all but the most trivial scenarios. However, this does not preclude the partial 
automation of this process or providing tools which can assist human managers to refine 
high-level abstract policies into more concrete ones. This will require representing and taking 
into account domain specific knowledge as well as more general techniques and 
methodologies. Currently the most promising approach seems to be investigated in 
requirements engineering and relies on identifying, recognising and instantiating refinement 
patterns [34]. A much simpler approach of integrating Service Level goals with policies is 
described in [35]. 
It is desirable to maintain the properties of consistency and completeness when refining an 
abstract goal into a set of more concrete policies. By consistency we mean that there is no 
conflict between those policies derived by refinement from a high-level goal nor are they in 
conflict with the other policies within the system. By completeness we mean that the set of 
policies derived by refinement fully implement the intended specification of the abstract goal. 
Using established patterns would help towards maintaining both these properties as patterns 
can be previously checked for completeness and for conflicts. Note, that this does not ensure 
that conflicts will not occur with other policies in the system thus even when instantiating 
established patterns it is necessary to perform conflict analysis.  
5.3 Multiple levels of policy  
Policies can be used to support adaptability at multiple levels in a network (i) within network-
aware applications, (ii) within application-aware networks, and (iii) at the hardware level to 
support adaptability in the packet forwarding “fastpath” of network elements. Research is 
needed on defining interfaces for the exchange of policies between these levels. For example 
an application specific policy may be more efficiently interpreted within a network 
component or an application may need to adapt its behaviour as a result of adaptation within 
the network. However it is not easy to map the semantics of the policies between the different 
levels. The application may not be aware of what components exist within the network and so 
how can it specify policies to be interpreted by them? 
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An interesting variation of the above is to consider a policy feedback loop where the system 
is monitored to see whether it is performing according to high-level policies or to determine 
changes in the systems due to faults, new applications or users appearing and hence to 
dynamically modify the lower level policies in order to adapt the behaviour.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Management and security are closely linked. Access control is essential to protect objects so 
that only authorized manager agents can perform management operations on them. Security 
needs to be managed to disseminate relevant policies to the agents that will implement them, 
specific actions are needed to deal with security violations and flexible policies are needed 
for response to intrusions. Concepts such as roles are useful both for security and 
management for grouping the policies applying to a position in an organization.  
In this paper we have described approaches to specifying both security and management 
policy and then discussed the Ponder framework which caters for both types of policy.  
There is considerable interest in policy-based systems, from standardization groups, industry 
and academia. However most of the literature relates to proposed systems or small academic 
prototypes. There is no reported experience of deploying policy-based management in any 
large-scale system. It is thus too early to judge whether the promised flexibility of policy 
based adaptive systems will actually materialize.  
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